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TAXATION: PROOF REQUIRED TO OPEN A "CLOSED" TAx YEAR
The statute of limitations bars the levying of taxes three years after the date
of filing a return.1 Such "closed years," however, are subject to being re-opened
at any time in cases of willful or fraudulent attempt to evade income taxes.2
The question which arises in the practical application of this last mentioned
rule is: What test must be met by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in order to
entitle it to compel the taxpayer to participate, by testimony or production of
his records, in their investigations of closed tax years? This problem arose in
O'Coinor v. O'Connell.3
Pursuant to the provisions of section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954,4 O'Connor was served with a summons from the Bureau ordering him to
testify with regard to a possible tax liability for alleged deficiencies for the years
1943 to 1947 and 1951 to 1954. O'Connor appeared and admitted his liability
for deficiencies in tax payments for the years 1951 to 1954. When questioned
concerning the years 1943 to 1947 O'Connor was advised by counsel not to
testify on the grounds the statute of limitations had run.5 He insisted that, in
the absence of a showing of some evidence of fraud as required by section
6501 (c) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 6 he was under no legal duty to discuss
those years. The Bureau contended it need only show that it had a subjective belief
of fraud by the taxpayer in order to permit investigation into the closed years.
Shortly thereafter the Bureau secured a subpoena from the federal district
court ordering O'Connor to re-appear in answer to the summons and testify as
IINT. REV. CoDE OF 1954 § 6501:
Limitations on Assessment and Collection: (A) General rule.-Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within
3 years after the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the
date prescribed) ... and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of
such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period.
2INT. RFV. CoDE OF 1954 § 6501(c) (2):
(C) Exceptions.-(2) Willful attempt to evade tax.--n case of a willful attempt in any
manner to defeat or evade tax imposed by this title (other than tax imposed by subtitle
A or B), the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax
may be begun without assessment, at any time.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 6501 is also modified by other exceptions besides fraud, including
waiver and certain omissions from gross income.
3253 F.2d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1958).
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7602(2):
Examination of Books and Witnesses. For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness
of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of
any person for any internal revenue tax ... or collecting any such liability, the Secretary
or his delegate is authorized ... (2) to summon the person liable for tax or required to
perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having posses-
sion, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of
the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary
or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time
and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other
data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such
inquiry;
See note 1 supra.
See note 2 supra.
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to the years 1943 to 1947. 7 Affirming the position taken by the Bureau at the
initial meeting with O'Connor, the district court stated that it was satisfied by
the sworn testimony of the Bureau's investigating agent that an investigation
was necessary.
8
O'Connor appealed this order to the circuit court, which reversed, rejecting
the test laid down by the district court:9
. .. We think the Secretary [of the Treasury] or his delegate, when a court order is
needed to enforce compliance with a summons to testify as to a "closed" year, should
be required to establish to the court's satisfaction that there is probable cause for an
investigation into such a year. We think Congress intended to give taxpayers this
much protection when the investigation of their returns may reach far back into the
past, in this case fourteen years ... and that to require such a showing does not
impose too heavy a burden upon the tax authorities or unduly restrict or hamper
them in tax enforcement.
The circuit court based its decision primarily upon its interpretation of section
7605 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which limits the Bureau's
power of investigation and expresses a policy that no taxpayer shall be subjected
to unnecessary examinations or investigations. The circuit court reasoned that
this limitation was consistent with those which had traditionally been placed
upon governmental investigatory bodies.'0
Conceding that its test may be contrary to the weight of authority, the
circuit court emphasized that the law, as applied in the various courts, with
regard to opening tax years "closed except for fraud" is in conflict"' but that
its position on the issue is supported by the better reason.
The majority view, used by the district court, would entitle the Bureau to
a subpoena enforcing a summons for purposes of investigating a closed year upon
the Bureau's expressing a subjective belief of fraud or willful evasion. 12 It would
appear that this test does not place the proper burden of proof on the Bureau
of Internal Revenue.
In rejecting the district court test, the circuit court expressly disapproved,
7 INT. REv. CODE Or 1954 § 7604(a):
(a) Jurisdiction of District Court.-If any person is summoned under the internal
revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data,
the United States district court for the district in which such person resides or is found
shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or
production of books, papers, records, or other data.
8 253 F.2d at 368.
9 1d. at 370.1 0 In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 304 (E.C.N.Y. 1941).
11See, e.g., Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942); Application of
House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 304
(E.D.N.Y. 1941) ; In re Andrews' Tax Liability, 18 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1937). But see, e.g.,
Norda Essential Oil and Chem. Co. v. United States, 230 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 964 (1956); Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Peoples
Deposit and Trust Co. v. United States, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838
(1954); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864
(1953) ; United States v. United Distillers Prods. Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Applica-
tion of Carroll, 149 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957); Application of Levine, 149 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd,
243 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1956) ; In re Wood, 123 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Ky. 1954), 130 F. Supp. 121
(W.D. Ky. 1955); In re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
12 253 F.2d at 368.
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on principle, two recent cases' 3 in which production of books and records was
ordered pursuant to an investigation of possible tax evasion. The theory of those
courts was that the Bureau should not have to prove its grounds for investigations
prior to obtaining the very records which would provide the proof.14 Both cases
involved section 7602 with reference to the running of the three year statute of
limitations, as did O'Connor.
The basis of the limitation on the investigatory power of the Bureau 5 appears
to have been overlooked by the district court in O'Connor.
In a 1956 case, Application of House,'8 it was pointed out that section
7605 (b) has received inadequate judicial interpretation. This lack of judicial
interpretation exists in spite of the fact that the section is not a recent addition
to the code.' 7 It was first enacted in 1921 and has been subsequently re-enacted
in 1924, 1939, and 1954 with only minor changes in language. The continual
re-enactment of this section undoubtedly evidences the legislature's intent that
it should serve to curtail the investigatory powers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
There are public policy considerations which lend further support to the
circuit court view in O'Connor.
Generally, in years not barred by the statute of limitations, the government's
interest in the speedy and orderly collection of revenue far outweighs that of
the taxpayer in being free from investigation.' 8 This should not be construed
as sanctioning unreasonable investigations into years not barred by the statute
of limitations, but rather a frank admission that by no other means can the fiscal
affairs of our government be managed.' 9 However once the statute of limitations
has run the interest of the taxpaper deserves greater weight. People die, move
away, memories fade with the passage of time.2 0
O'Connor illustrates that, following its own policy of destroying outdated
returns, the Bureau had no choice but to call upon the taxpayer to testify. The
honest taxpayer should be free to assume that he also can destroy outdated
records and make room for the new. The statute of limitations would seem to
permit this course of action. In O'Connor the taxpayer also alleged that the
lawyer who prepared his tax returns for the years in question had died and the
accountant who assisted was now over eighty and suffering from a defective
memory.2 1
The Constitution 22 guarantees the people "the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,"
'3 Globe Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. United
Distillers Prods. Corp., 156 F.2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1946).
14 156 F.2d at 874.
15 INT. REV. CODE Or 1954 § 7605(b):
No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations ....
16 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D.Cal. 1956).
17INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 7605(b) was derived from Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 3631.
The 1939 code section was derived from the act of Feb. 26, 1926, C. 27, § 1105, 44 Stat. 113.
Provisions similar to those in the 1954 and 1939 code sections were contained in the following
prior acts; June 2, 1924, C. 234, § 1005, 43 Stat. 340; Nov. 23, 1921, C. 136, § 1309, 42 Stat. 310.
18 253 F.2d at 369.
19 Ibid.
20 253 F.2d at 369.
2 1 Ibid.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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